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A REMEDY BEYOND REACH: THE STRINGENT
STANDARD IN ILLINOIS FOR EXCLUSIVE
POSSESSION OF THE MARITAL HOME
DURING DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
Divorce in the United States has become relatively commonplace,1
impacting over one million parents annually.2  The divorce process
typically lasts one year from initial filing to entry of final judgment for
dissolution of the marriage.3  But the process may last much longer if
the parties fall victim to the culturally ingrained expectation that a
divorce is always a “bitter conflict,” especially if children are in-
volved.4  For some couples, no passage of time is sufficient to amelio-
rate the emotions inherent in the divorce process—such as loss, grief,
and anger—and these emotions can “embroil them in a long-term
conflict.”5  Approximately one-third of divorcing parties have a diffi-
cult time adjusting to this emotional, life-changing event, and
5%–10% of that group never adjusts.6  Parties in this latter category
are more likely to engage in what is known as  “high-conflict” divorce:
a dissolution proceeding characterized by never-ending litigation, con-
tinuously high levels of anger and distrust, the possibility of verbal or
physical abuse, and the inability to communicate with each other.7
Even with the help of therapists and mediators, these conflicted par-
ties may be unable to come to an agreement on any issue, thereby
1. Janet Weinstein & Ricardo Weinstein, “I Know Better Than That”: The Role of Emotions
and the Brain in Family Law Disputes, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 351, 362 n.34 (2005).  The divorce
rate peaked at 50% in the 1980s and has since dropped steadily to somewhere between 40% and
50% today.  Anneli Rufus, 15 Ways to Predict Divorce, DAILY BEAST (May 19, 2010), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/05/19/15-ways-to-predict-divorce.html.
2. JESSICA G. LIPPMAN & PADDY GREENWALL LEWIS, DIVORCING WITH CHILDREN: EXPERT
ANSWERS TO TOUGH QUESTIONS FROM PARENTS AND CHILDREN 79 (2008).
3. BENJAMIN D. GARBER, KEEPING KIDS OUT OF THE MIDDLE: CHILD-CENTERED PARENT-
ING IN THE MIDST OF CONFLICT, SEPARATION, AND DIVORCE 131 (2008).
4. See Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 388–89.
5. Id. at 366, 389.
6. Arnold T. Shienvold, The High-Conflict Divorce & Your Children’s Adjustment, FAM. AD-
VOC., Summer 2011, at 32, 33.
7. Id.; see also GARBER, supra note 3, at 131 (describing high-conflict type divorces as involv-
ing parents who persist with “unending litigation . . . return[ing] to court dozens and even hun-
dreds of times over a period that might go on forever, were it not for the eventual celebration of
the child’s eighteenth birthday”); cf. Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 378 (“Prolonged
family law conflicts remain in the court system for years.”).
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exacerbating the conflict in what is an inherently adversarial process.8
Courts typically act passively in a case under the assumption that liti-
gating parties will behave rationally and do what is necessary to re-
solve their issues.9  But high-conflict divorce parties, who are
characterized by irrational emotions and behavior, require “special
handling.”10
Often, at least one spouse during a divorce would prefer to avoid as
much contact with the other as possible.11  In Illinois, however, divorc-
ing parties may find themselves interacting significantly more often
than they would prefer if neither will vacate the marital home and
obtain alternative housing for the pendency of the divorce proceed-
ing.12  High-conflict divorce couples usually include one partner that
refuses to leave the home because he or she still wants contact with or
control over the other spouse.  Alternatively, one spouse may be fi-
nancially dependent upon the other, making it difficult for him or her
to leave the home, despite a desire to do so.  When high-conflict di-
vorce parents continue to cohabit during divorce proceedings,
“[t]ensions flare, arguments ensue, and violence often erupts.”13
And yet, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
(IMDMA)14 currently “makes little effort to definitively separate war-
ring couples living under the same roof.”15  Section 701 of the
IMDMA permits a spouse to petition for a court order granting exclu-
sive possession of the marital home pending termination of divorce
proceedings, but it imposes a strict standard to prevail.16  The peti-
tioner must show that the other spouse’s continued presence in the
home jeopardizes the physical or mental well-being of the petitioner
8. GARBER, supra note 3, at 132.
9. Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 394.
10. Id.
11. One divorcee recalls the awkwardness of continuing to live with her husband for months
after they separated and during their divorce: “It was really hard. . . .  You’re living in the house
and trying to stay out of each other’s way.  Mealtimes were awkward—are you sitting together as
a family?”  Kathleen Lynn, The Great Divide: Divorce and Home Sale, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 17,
2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-02-17/classified/sc-cons-0216-divorce-homesale-
20120217_1_divorcing-couples-divorcing-spouses-housing-market (quoting Jamie Bolnick).
12. See Meghan E. Nemeth, Is the Burden for Exclusive Possession of the Home in Divorce
Too High?, CBA REC., Nov. 2009, at 44, 44 (“Name one lawsuit, other than a divorce, where the
plaintiff and defendant live under the same roof[.]”).
13. Id.
14. Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, Pub. Act. No. 80-923, 1977 Ill. Laws
2675 (codified as amended at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/101–802 (2012)).
15. Nemeth, supra note 12, at 44.
16. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/701; see also Nemeth, supra note 12, at 44. The section 701 process
“can be arduous for a party with a legitimate need to live separate from their spouse.” Id.
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or the children.17  Absent this finding of “jeopardy,” Illinois courts
have been reluctant to order one party in a pending divorce case to
vacate the marital home, regardless of the level of tension and hostil-
ity between the parties.18
This Comment addresses the section 701 standard in light of the
psychological negative effects that high-conflict divorce has on the
parties’ children and argues that the jeopardy standard effectively
overlooks those subtler effects.  Part II reviews research demonstrat-
ing the negative effects on children who are exposed to high-conflict
divorce in the home19 and presents section 701 and its accompanying
Illinois appellate caselaw.20  Additionally, Part II introduces section
214 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act (DVA): an analogous, yet
independent route to exclusive possession of the home that requires a
lesser showing than IMDMA section 701.21
Part III critiques the current section 701 statutory language and
caselaw and argues that the long-term, psychological, harmful effects
on the children of high-conflict divorce should be deemed to jeopard-
ize their emotional and mental well-being.22  Part III argues alterna-
tively that section 701 should be reformed to include the “balance of
the hardships” test applied under DVA section 21423 and lays out this
proposed reform.24  Part IV argues that unless the current standard
under section 701 is relaxed or modified, continuing to permit the par-
ties to cohabit the marital home during high-conflict divorce proceed-
ings will undermine the goals and purposes of the IMDMA.25  Part IV
further argues that either relaxing the current section 701 standard or
reforming it as proposed will have the incidental effect of deterring
the parties from seeking exclusive possession under DVA section 214,
thereby lightening up the domestic violence court dockets and al-
lowing for more attention to genuine domestic violence victims.26
II. BACKGROUND
Section 701 of the IMDMA allows a party involved in an acrimoni-
ous divorce to seek exclusive possession of the marital residence to
17. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/701.
18. Nemeth, supra note 12, at 44.
19. See infra notes 31–79 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 80–120 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 121–132 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 133–162 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 163–192 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 193–196 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 197–209 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 197–209 and accompanying text.
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make her living situation more bearable during the proceeding.27
Children who are exposed to high-conflict divorce in the home are
negatively affected during the divorce with life-lasting impact.28  Illi-
nois appellate courts have construed section 701 to pose a high burden
that has yet to encompass these negative effects under its jeopardy
standard.29  Meanwhile, section 214 of the DVA uses a more peti-
tioner-friendly balance of the hardships test.30
A. The Effect of High-Conflict Divorce on the Child
Children are the collateral damage in any divorce.31  The divorcing
parents’ behavior in the home can make this inherently traumatic ex-
perience even more difficult for the children.32  Parents in a high-con-
flict divorce allow their own feelings to take priority over those of
their children.33  Such parental behavior is unhelpful during a divorce
and only harms the children, who feel helpless and fearful when
caught in the middle of their arguing parents.34  But because these
parents are controlled by their emotions, switching the focus from
their feelings and needs to those of their children is not an easy task.35
1. When High-Conflict Divorce Parents Cohabit the Marital Home
During each stage of development, a child’s learning experience is
“profoundly affected” by how she lives in and sees her environment.36
Parental behaviors and attitudes in the home serve as a developmen-
tal blueprint for a child’s brain.37  The developing child picks up on
“subtle and overt feedback” from her parents, which teaches her
which types of conduct are preferable and which types are undesir-
27. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/701 (2012).
28. See infra notes 31–79 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 80–120 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 121–132 and accompanying text.
31. LIPPMAN & LEWIS, supra note 2, at 1–2.  “Divorce is devastating for the children . . . .  It is
the death of a family.” Id. at 79.
32. Id. at 79; see also Shienvold, supra note 6, at 34 (noting that children suffer when their
parents cannot resolve their conflicts “expeditiously and with the least acrimony possible”); cf.
Miguel A. Firpi & Andrew Wenger, The High-Conflict Family: What Ongoing Fighting Means
for Your Children, FAM. ADVOC., Summer 2004, at 32, 32 (stating that if the divorce process is
“managed well, the [children’s] experience will be less traumatic”).
33. LIPPMAN & LEWIS, supra note 2, at 79, 90.  This is often the case even though the chil-
dren’s health and safety should always be the parents’ first priority. GARBER, supra note 3, at
45.
34. See Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 373.
35. Id.
36. Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 35.
37. Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 359.
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able.38  This process shapes the neuropathways in her brain that deter-
mine future behavior and attitudes.39 Because a child of any age
learns from her models, her childhood experiences will likely affect
her needs, feelings, and decisions in adulthood.40  As previously
noted, high-conflict divorce parents are characterized by high levels of
anger and distrust and they often cannot communicate with each
other.41  Experiencing this parental conflict causes a child stress that
could become patterned in her brain, thereby determining her con-
duct in future relationships.42
Regardless of the child’s age, parents cannot disguise marital con-
flict in the home from their child.43  Even if she does not actually see
or hear her parents argue, she can sense the conflict and tension in
their relationship.44  The parents can also draw the children into their
conflict, by arguing in front of them or by one parent creating alli-
ances with a child against the other parent.45  Even worse, a parent
who takes his or her anger out on a child prioritizes the adult’s feel-
ings and needs over those of the child and forces the child to confront
problems that the child is too young to comprehend.46
Overall, high-conflict divorce parents who cohabit and constantly
argue terrify their young children, create a fearful home environment,
and, in the long term, can cause their children to lose the ability to
38. Id. at 360.
39. Id.
40. Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 35.
41. Shienvold, supra note 6, at 33.
42. Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 387.
43. See GARBER, supra note 3, at 48.
44. Id.  If the children do actually see their parents furious with one another, “[i]t can be
devastating.”  Julie Taylor, Be a Calm(er) Mom, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, http://www.good-
housekeeping.com/family/parenting-tips/anger-management-parents (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
Moreover, privately resolving a conflict that occurred in front of children may cause them to
worry that their parents’ conflict persists. GARBER, supra note 3, at 60.
45. GARBER, supra note 3, at 48.  An example of alliance-creation includes one parent undo-
ing the other’s disciplining of the child, thereby undermining the disciplining parent’s authority.
Id. at 51.  Another example is when one parent asks the child to keep a secret from the other.
Id. at 52.  Over time, an alliance with one parent can undermine the child’s relationship with the
non-allied parent. Id. at 53.
46. Id. at 96.  Judith Wallerstein and Sandra Blakeslee note the risk of a parent’s anger spilling
onto innocent people. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, WHAT ABOUT THE
KIDS? RAISING YOUR CHILDREN BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER DIVORCE 15 (2003). One
mother, whose husband had recently left her, unintentionally lashed out at her six-year-old son:
“After being screamed at for ten minutes, the small child turned with a hurt look and said,
‘Mommy, what did I do?’” Id. See also Taylor, supra note 44 (“Like it or not, most of us parents
flip out in front of our dear children from time to time.  Sometimes the anger is aimed at them,
other times [it’s] not, but it’s always a deeply unsettling experience.”).  A recent New Hampshire
study found that 90% of parents admitted to hollering at their children aged 2–12 in the course
of one year. Id.
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trust others.47  These children demonstrate a higher degree of inter-
nalizing problems like anxiety, obsessive worrying, and depression,
and they have difficulty concentrating, paying attention, regulating
emotions, and sleeping.48  These children often externalize problems
like “aggressiveness, anger, academic difficulties, poorer peer rela-
tionships, resentment of authority, inability to adapt to new situations,
sexual acting-out, [and] drug and alcohol use,” as well as long-term
problems in adulthood with intimacy in their own marriages.49  The
more developmental stages a child consecutively proceeds through
while consistently exposed to the parental conflict, the greater the po-
tential for damage to her brain development.50
2. Age-Specific Effects of High-Conflict Divorce on Children in the
Home
Infants and young children are especially reliant on their parents for
emotional development.51  They can sense a change in a parent’s
mood and tone of voice and are aware of any stress and tension.52  If
an infant senses her parents are “tense or emotionally distraught,” she
may experience immediate symptoms like “irritability, changes in eat-
ing habits, an increase in crying and fussiness, and sleep-related
problems.”53  Moreover, because an infant’s brain development de-
pends on the function of her caretaker’s brain,54 her long-term physi-
cal and emotional development may also be negatively impacted.55
47. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 46, at 128.  “Prolonged rallies of rage” cause
younger children to feel “insecurity and fear” and older children to feel “resentment and anger.”
Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 387.
48. Shienvold, supra note 6, at 33; see also Jen Weigel, Can Your Divorce Be Collaborative?,
CHI. TRIB. (July 10, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-10/lifestyle/ct-tribu-weigel-
collaborative-divorce-20120710_1_divorcing-couples-certified-divorce-financial-analyst-average-
divorce (noting that when spouses “bad-mouth” each other, this may cause the children “anxiety
about returning home”).
49. Shienvold, supra note 6, at 33.
50. Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 359–60.
51. Id. at 371.
52. Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 32; see also GARBER, supra note 3, at 47 (explaining how
newborns respond to the emotional tone of voices and have a different experience of being held
by a calm parent versus an angry parent).
53. Shienvold, supra note 6, at 33; see also GARBER, supra note 3, at 47 (“[V]isual, audible,
and tactile experiences of emotional pressure can cause [the infant] to become tense herself, cry
and refuse food or become unable to hold [food] down.”).
54. See Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 381.
55. GARBER, supra note 3, at 47.
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Long-term exposure to continuous emotional pressure can have last-
ing negative influences on her brain functioning.56
Toddlers between the ages of two and five react strongly and emo-
tionally to stimuli like “raised voices, arguments, [and] insults.”57  Ar-
guments in the home cause stress that disrupts the consistency and
stability of a toddler’s routine.58  This environment is stressful because
her once nurturing parents, who formerly provided structure and pro-
tection, are now too angry or emotionally unavailable to meet her
needs.59  When a toddler who lacks this sense of safety reaches adult-
hood, she may be apprehensive of “new situations and relationships
with others” and require partners to satisfy “excessive needs of secur-
ity and reassurance.”60  Toddlers may also suffer from regression—the
process by which emotional pressure causes a child’s behavior to be-
come less mature.61  Additionally, they may become withdrawn and
developmentally delayed.62  Toddlers may even imitate and display
their parents’ angry behavior.63  Overall, a high-conflict divorce makes
a toddler feel helpless to control her environment, and if this feeling is
not addressed, the toddler’s anxiety and insecurity can persist for the
remainder of her life.64
Children in elementary school are particularly vulnerable to their
parents’ conflict and arguing.65  When children are routinely exposed
to negative comments about either parent, they instinctively adopt
manipulative behaviors to manage the conflict.66  For example, a child
56. Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 372; see also Firpi & Wegner, supra note 32, at 32
(arguing that parental conflict may damage an infant’s ability to “develop positive and secure
attachments far into the future”).
57. Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 32.
58. Shienvold, supra note 6, at 33; see also Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 32–33 (stating
that toddlers experience “confusion and fear” during parental conflict, though they do not un-
derstand much else aside from the fact that “something is terribly wrong”).
59. Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 33; see also Shienvold, supra note 6, at 33.
60. Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 33.
61. GARBER, supra note 3, at 47.  Regression includes behaviors like thumb sucking or losing
accomplished developmental skills, such as potty training.  Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 33.
Over time, regression can damage the child’s sense of self and impair her ability to develop
healthy relationships in the future.  GARBER, supra note 3, at 47.
62. Shienvold, supra note 6, at 33.  For example, the toddler’s ability to develop her sense of
trust or “self-soothing” skills may suffer. Id.
63. Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 33.
64. Id.
65. Shienvold, supra note 6, at 33.  The child may become extremely depressed and withdrawn
or extremely angry, depending on his personality. Id. at 34.  Children with diagnosed attention
problems, learning differences or autism can also perceive and respond to their parents’ emo-
tions just like nondisabled children their age, even if the former have more trouble adequately
verbalizing their experience.  GARBER, supra note 3, at 48.
66. Shienvold, supra note 6, at 34.
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may tell one parent what he wants to hear or actively lie to prevent
being seen as an “ally of the ‘other side.’”67  By learning to lie, the
children may even stop identifying their own feelings, which can lead
to “dysfunctional relationships” later in life.68  Further, if a child is
preoccupied with developing survival instincts to endure her parents’
fighting, she cannot spend appropriate time fostering her indepen-
dence, peer development, and school adjustment, which will make her
vulnerable in those areas in the future.69  In future relationships, she
may be passive or accommodating because she will have difficulty
with honesty and straightforwardness, which in turn makes her more
“vulnerable to exploitation or even abuse.”70  Preadolescent children
between the ages of nine and twelve may even exhibit their parents’
“dysfunctional relationship patterns,” which may negatively impact
their adult relationships.71
While an adolescent or teenager may seem like she is in her own
world, she too notices her divorcing parents’ emotional struggles in
the home.72  In fact, a teenager who may seem absorbed in media,
sports, drugs, alcohol, or even a gang may be engaging in those activi-
ties only to escape the tension at home.73  She may also be distracted
from developing her own identity, improving academically and voca-
tionally, and strengthening her peer relationships.74  Instead, she may
become angry toward her parents, neglect school, and act out in other
ways.75  Adolescence is “the most vulnerable time . . . in terms of de-
veloping social and intimate peer relationships,”76 and when she most
needs a “‘road map’ for healthy, respectful, and reciprocal relation-
ships.”77  If she is forced to view a poor model of an adult relationship
at home, she may “develop interpersonal behaviors that are dysfunc-
tional, such as sexual acting-out.”78  Additionally, the idea of locating
an intimate partner can be “worrisome and anxiety provoking” for an
67. Id.; see also Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 33.
68. Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 33.
69. Shienvold, supra note 6, at 34.
70. Firpi & Wegner, supra note 32, at 33–34.
71. Id.
72. See id.; see also Sheinvold, supra note 6, at 34.
73. See Shienvold, supra note 6, at 34; see also Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 35.
74. Shienvold, supra note 6, at 34.
75. Id.; see also Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 34.
76. Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 34.
77. Id.
78. Shienvold, supra note 6, at 34.
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adolescent who was “deprived of a healthy role model for relation-
ships at a critically formative time of development.”79
B. High-Conflict Divorces and Section 701 of the IMDMA
A spouse in the middle of a contentious, high-conflict divorce may
realize she cannot go through the entire proceeding while cohabiting
the marital residence with her spouse.  If the other spouse takes no
initiative to obtain alternative housing, what judicial relief is available
in Illinois?  In 1977, the General Assembly passed section 701 of the
IMDMA:
Marital Residence—Order Granting Possession to Spouse.  Where
there is on file a verified complaint or verified petition seeking tem-
porary eviction from the marital residence, the court may, during
the pendency of the proceeding, only in cases where the physical or
mental well being of either spouse or their children is jeopardized
by occupancy of the marital residence by both spouses, and only
upon due notice and full hearing, unless waived by the court on
good cause shown, enter orders of injunction, mandatory or re-
straining, granting the exclusive possession of the marital residence
to either spouse, by eviction from, or restoration of, the marital resi-
dence, until the final determination of the cause.  No such order
shall in any manner affect any estate in homestead property of ei-
ther party.80
Courts have “broad authority to intervene when necessary” to fulfill
their duty of protecting “spouses and children when their well being is
jeopardized” by co-occupancy of the divorcing parties.81 Appellate re-
view of a lower court’s ruling on a section 701 petition is greatly defer-
ential, and findings of fact will not be disturbed unless manifestly
against the weight of the evidence.82  A trial court is not required by
the “plain language of section 701 . . . to make specific findings of
fact” when it rules on a petition.83
1. Application of Section 701
The Illinois appellate courts interpreting section 701 have imposed
a high bar for success.84  None of the decisions thus far have provided
79. See Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 34–35.  A marriage characterized by conflict can
“exacerbate[] the already intense and difficult task of developing intimacy, empathy, and reci-
procity in relationships” for adolescents. Id. at 34.  They may even worry about having a “better
marriage than their parents.” Id.
80. Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, Pub. Act. No. 80-923, § 701, 1977 Ill.
Laws 2675, 2698 (codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/701 (2012)).
81. In re Marriage of Heinrich, 2011 IL App (2d) 110683-U, ¶ 16.
82. Id. ¶ 23 (quoting In re Marriage of Lima, 638 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)).
83. Id. ¶ 24.
84. In re Marriage of Levinson, 975 N.E.2d 270, 281 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
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a specific definition of the terms “well-being” or “jeopardized” as they
appear in section 701.85  The first case to rule on a section 701 petition,
In re Marriage of Hofstetter,86 may be responsible for the stringent
jeopardy standard currently in effect.
In Hofstetter, the wife simultaneously filed petitions for dissolution
of marriage and exclusive possession of the marital home under sec-
tion 701.87  She alleged that her husband of almost nine years “beat
and struck her; that she had no place to live; and that it was dangerous
to her physical, emotional and mental well-being to reside [with
him].”88  She testified about an incident when he became upset that
she had not cooked him breakfast, began yelling at her, kicked her,
and hit her with his fist, a gun, and an iron.89  She further alleged that
he pointed the gun at her, shot it twice, and threatened to kill her.90
On appeal the Illinois Appellate Court, First District upheld the trial
court’s grant of exclusive possession of the marital home to the wife,
finding sufficient evidence to determine that the “husband’s presence
in the marital home would jeopardize the wife’s physical and emo-
tional well-being.”91
Almost ten years later, in In re Marriage of Lombaer, the first dis-
trict reversed a trial court’s grant of exclusive possession to the peti-
tioning husband.92  After considering the wife’s multiple forced
hospitalizations for failure to take prescribed medications to treat her
mental illness and her erratic behavior around the parties’ children,93
the court held that the evidence was “insufficient . . . to establish that
the mental or physical well being of the parties or the children would
be jeopardized” by her continued co-occupancy of the home.94  The
court found nothing in the record below regarding the “nature, fre-
quency, severity, pattern and consequences of past abuse and the like-
lihood of future abuse.”95  Four years later, in In re Marriage of Lima,
85. Id.
86. In re Marriage of Hofstetter, 430 N.E.2d 79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
87. Id. at 81.
88. Id. at 80–81.
89. Id. at 81.
90. Id. at 81–82.  He admitted to striking and beating her.  Id.  He recalled: “[S]he became
furious and so did I.  I should have calmed down and walked out of the house.” Id. at 82.
91. Id.
92. In re Marriage of Lombaer, 558 N.E.2d 388 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
93. See id. at 391–92.  Such erratic behavior included restlessness, weight loss, irritability, ner-
vousness, short temper with the children, not properly supervising the children and letting them
have the “run of the apartment,” looking through binoculars at other buildings, eating baby
food, and believing someone had “drugged her water” after an antismoking class. Id. at 392.
94. Id. at 395.
95. Id.
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the Illinois Second District Appellate Court reversed a trial court’s
grant of exclusive possession of the marital home to the petitioning
wife.96  The court held that neither an isolated incident of nonconsen-
sual sexual intercourse initiated by the husband97 nor the wife’s onset
of diabetes and related complications since commencement of dissolu-
tion proceedings supported a finding that her physical or mental well-
being was jeopardized by the husband’s co-occupancy of the home.98
The Illinois Appellate courts did not analyze another section 701
case until 2011.  In In re Marriage of Heinrich, the second district af-
firmed the trial court’s grant of exclusive possession of the marital
home to the petitioning wife.99  After considering evidence that the
husband consumed excessive amounts of alcohol, used profane lan-
guage toward her in front of their two children, and was verbally abu-
sive,100 the second district determined that the trial court “could have
reasonably concluded that occupancy of the marital residence by both
[parties] jeopardized the well being of either [the wife] or the children,
or both.”101  The Heinrich court noted that actual physical violence is
not a prerequisite to satisfy the jeopardy standard under section
701.102
In 2012, the first district reversed the trial court’s grant of exclusive
possession of the marital home to the petitioning wife in In re Mar-
riage of Levinson.103  The court noted that the children’s guardian ad
litem did not characterize the home environment to be dangerous, de-
spite his opinion that co-occupancy of the home caused everyone “un-
due stress” and was not in the best interest of the children.104  The
trial court had found the “birdnesting” parenting arrangement—
under which each parent occupied the home during their scheduled
96. In re Marriage of Lima, 638 N.E.2d 1186 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
97. See id. at 1187.
98. Id. at 1189.
99. In re Marriage of Heinrich, 2011 IL App (2d) 110683-U.
100. See id. ¶¶ 3–5.  The husband had been ordered (and failed) to undergo an alcohol evalu-
ation. Id. ¶ 8.  The wife called the police on one occasion to dispel a dispute between them in
front of their children, one of whom was upset and crying.  Id. ¶ 7.  She called the police because
she felt “shaken” and “agitated.” Id.
101. Id. ¶ 24.  The court acknowledged that there was conflicting evidence regarding the dis-
pute and that the situation in the home following it had “improved dramatically,” but reasoned
that the trial court, which “was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses,”
could have rejected that evidence. Id. ¶ 26.  Further supporting the lower court’s holding was
the fact that the husband had an alternate residence in Wisconsin that he frequently used, and
the children’s court-appointed guardian ad litem recommended that the wife have exclusive pos-
session of the home.  Id. ¶¶ 6, 9.
102. Id. ¶ 26.
103. In re Marriage of Levinson, 975 N.E.2d 270 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
104. Id. at 282.
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parenting time—caused the wife “high personal stress,”105 which she
believed also indirectly affected the children.106  However, the appel-
late court held that this stress was insufficient to constitute “jeopardy”
under section 701.107  The court also acknowledged that possession of
the home was “being used as a tool in the arsenals of . . . two individu-
als involved in a contentious divorce,” but the court was “not free to
set [its] own standard.”108  Accordingly, the court refused to define
jeopardy under section 701 “in a more expansive manner” than the
term had previously been defined in the Lima, Lombaer, and Hofstet-
ter cases.109
The most recent section 701 case to reach the Illinois appellate level
was In re Marriage of Akers, in which the second district affirmed the
trial court’s grant of exclusive possession of the marital home to the
petitioning wife.110  The parties had agreed that the husband would
reside in a previously purchased second residence if they ultimately
divorced.  Despite moving there several months after she filed her pe-
tition for dissolution,111 he returned to the marital home after she filed
her section 701 petition and relentlessly insisted on discussing the di-
vorce, causing her to feel “fearful, bullied, and upset.”112  First, the
second district agreed with the trial court’s reasoning that the parties’
105. Id.  She felt anxious about sharing the home with her husband because she had no pri-
vacy and had to pack and unpack her personal belongings in padlocked storage boxes each time
he arrived for his parenting time. Id. at 279.  Meanwhile, he owned several properties and had
family located nearby to stay with when he vacated the home during her parenting time. Id. at
273.
106. She alleged that the “changing of the guard” inherent in the parenting schedule (itself a
result of the “tension and hostility between the parties” that prevented them from being simulta-
neously in the same place) confused the children and made them feel abandoned, because they
did not understand why she was leaving, where she was going, if she had another home, or which
parent would be watching them. Id. at 273.  She further testified that their sons became more
aggressive with each other after his parenting time. Id. at 278.  The older son’s anxiety increased,
he was more emotional and easily frustrated, he began wetting his pants, and he would protest or
block the door when his father arrived for his parenting time. Id. at 278–79.
107. Id. at 282.  The court analogized to Lima, in which the wife unsuccessfully alleged that
her well-being was jeopardized due to stress resulting from the incident of nonconsensual sexual
intercourse: “Just as in Lima, this combination of factors is clearly not sufficient under section
701 to constitute jeopardy.” Id. at 283–84.
108. Id. at 284.  Instead, the court felt “bound” by the jeopardy standard set forth in section
701 as it had been previously interpreted. See id.
109. In re Levinson, 975 N.E.2d at 282.
110. In re Marriage of Akers, 2012 IL App (2d) 120526-U.
111. Id. ¶ 8.
112. Id. ¶¶ 8–9, 26.  He approached her in the home to speak about the divorce “once or
twice every two weeks,” often accused her of lying, and would continue to pursue the subject
even after she asked him to stop. Id. ¶ 9.  She further alleged that he drank alcohol almost daily,
that he could become aggressive, animated, and threatening when intoxicated, and that she had
sleeping difficulties as a result of his overall conduct. Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
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second residence and the time that the husband spent there were “rel-
evant to the consideration of [the wife’s] and the children’s physical
and mental well-being.”113  The court then held that, while the evi-
dence of the children’s well-being was “not abundantly specific,”114
the wife’s testimony concerning her own well-being was sufficient to
constitute jeopardy under section 701.115
Overall, Illinois appellate courts have affirmed section 701 petitions
if: (1) there is evidence of past physical abuse that indicates a possibil-
ity of future physical abuse;116 or (2) the situation between the parties
has escalated to such a level that, while physical abuse has not yet
occurred, the parties’ past interactions suggest that future physical
abuse is imminent if they continue residing together in the marital
home.117  The absence of evidence showing the “nature, frequency,
severity, pattern and consequences of past abuse and the likelihood of
future abuse”118 has proven to be fatal to a section 701 petition.119
Feelings of stress and discomfort absent a threat of violence resulting
from co-occupancy of the marital home have proven insufficient to
constitute jeopardy under section 701.120
C. An Alternative Route to Exclusive Possession of the
Marital Home
Under section 214 of the Domestic Violence Act (DVA), a party
may obtain an emergency order of protection granting exclusive pos-
session of the residence if a court finds that she has been abused by a
family or household member.121  “Abuse” includes harassment, which
is defined as knowing conduct that is unnecessary to achieve a reason-
113. Id. ¶ 22.
114. Id. ¶ 26.  When the children heard the parties arguing with one another, they would
“cringe and fold up . . . and withdraw.” Id. ¶ 10.
115. See id. ¶ 32.  The court distinguished the Levinson wife and children by explaining that
they only experienced “stress and confusion by the shared-residence and visitation arrange-
ments,” whereas the Akers wife “felt fearful and bullied and alleged that [the husband] utilized
the second residence to harass her.”  Id.  The court further distinguished Levinson by noting that
there was no birdnesting arrangement issue because the parties already had joint custody of the
children, the wife was the primary residential parent, and the parties agreed he “would reside
(and presumably parent) in the second residence.” Id.
116. See In re Marriage of Hofstetter, 430 N.E.2d 79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
117. See In re Marriage of Heinrich, 2011 IL App (2d) 110683-U; In re Akers, 2012 IL App
(2d) 120526-U.
118. In re Marriage of Lombaer, 558 N.E.2d 388, 395 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
119. See id.; In re Marriage of Lima, 638 N.E.2d 1186 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); In re Marriage of
Levinson, 975 N.E.2d 270 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
120. See In re Levinson, 975 N.E.2d 270; In re Lima, 638 N.E.2d 1186.
121. Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, Pub. Act. No. 84-1305, § 214, 1986 Ill. Laws 1602,
1611 (codified as amended at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 (2012)).
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able purpose and which “would cause a reasonable person emotional
distress.”122  Harassment “implies ‘intentional acts which cause some-
one to be worried, anxious, or uncomfortable.’”123
When deciding whether to grant an order of exclusive possession
under section 214, a court is not “limited by the [jeopardy] standard
set forth in Section 701 of the [IMDMA].”124  Instead, the court bal-
ances the hardships to the responding party (and any minor child in
his care) with the hardships to the petitioning party (and any minor
child in her care) that would result “from continued exposure to the
risk of abuse . . . or from loss of possession of the residence or house-
hold.”125  During this analysis, there is a presumption that the “bal-
ance of hardships” favors possession of the home by the petitioner,
unless the respondent can rebut the presumption by a preponderance
of the evidence by showing that his hardships “substantially outweigh”
the hardships to petitioner (and any minor child in her care).126  Alter-
natively, the petitioner can request that the court—rather than ex-
clude respondent from a mutual residence or household—order the
respondent to provide “suitable, accessible, alternate housing” for
petitioner.”127
Exclusive possession may be granted under section 214 in an ex
parte proceeding, “regardless of prior service of process or of notice
upon the respondent,” if the petitioner shows that the hardships to
respondent that would result from an emergency order granting peti-
tioner exclusive possession of the residence are outweighed by the
“immediate danger of further abuse.”128  Further, ex parte relief
under section 214 will not be denied if petitioner “has or could obtain
temporary shelter elsewhere while prior notice is given to respon-
dent.”129  The first district held that granting section 214 relief ex parte
is not a due process violation if the petition is “supported by affidavits
122. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(1), (7).
123. People v. Cardamone, 883 N.E.2d 628, 634 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (quoting People v. Taylor,
812 N.E.2d 759, 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)). But see Wilson v. Jackson, 728 N.E.2d 832, 840 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000) (arguing that the DVA was not intended to “exaggerate every petty argument
into a basis for an order of protection”).
124. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(2).
125. Id. § 214(b)(2)(B); see also In re Marriage of Akers, 2012 IL App (2d) 120526-U, ¶ 2
(noting that, unlike under section 701 of the IMDMA, balancing the hardships to the parties is
permissible under section 214(b)(2) of the DVA).
126. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(2)(B).
127. Id.  The court may also issue this order sua sponte. Id.
128. Id. § 217(a)(3)(ii).
129. Id.  However, ex parte relief will be denied if the hardships to respondent that would
result from exclusion from the home substantially outweigh those to the petitioner seeking ex
parte relief. Id.
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that demonstrate exigent circumstances” that would justify entry of an
emergency, ex parte order.130
Overall, it is easier to obtain exclusive possession of the residence
via an emergency order of protection under section 214 of the DVA
than to obtain the same relief in a divorce proceeding under section
701 of the IMDMA.131  This is due to the presumption that the “bal-
ance of hardships” favors possession of the home by the petitioner,
and the possibility of an ex parte hearing on the petition without prior
notice to the respondent.132
III. ANALYSIS
While not as immediate or visible as the effects of physical abuse,
arguing parents in the heat of a high-conflict divorce nonetheless have
devastating and long-term negative effects on their children’s mental
and emotional development, and this situation should constitute jeop-
ardy under section 701.  If a court denies a section 701 petition in a
high-conflict divorce case, those negative effects on the children are
only further perpetuated, subjecting the children to further exposure
and ultimately more lifelong harm.133  The current application of sec-
tion 701’s jeopardy standard does not encompass these subtler, nega-
tive effects on the children of a high-conflict divorce.134  If the current
jeopardy standard under section 701 cannot be interpreted to encom-
pass these negative effects, it should be reformed with a “balance of
the hardships” test similar to that applied under section 214 of the
DVA.135
130. Sanders v. Shephard, 541 N.E.2d 1150, 1155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).  The court reasoned that
notice was not required because “the harm which [this remedy] is intended to prevent would be
likely to occur if the respondent were given any prior notice.” Id. (quoting 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
60/217(a)(3)(i)).
131. See Scott A. Lerner, Sword or Shield? Combating Orders-of-Protection Abuse in Divorce,
95 ILL. B.J. 590 (2007) (“OPs [Orders of Protection] are easy to get, [easy to] use under the
DVA.”).
132. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(2)(B). See generally Lerner, supra note 131.  The
“expedited” nature of a proceeding under the DVA essentially means the court makes its deci-
sion “without hearing all of the relevant evidence.” Id. at 592.
133. Continuous arguing can also increase the risk of physical abuse: “Anger builds on anger;
the emotional brain heats up.  By then, rage, unhampered by reason, easily erupts in violence.”
Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 384 (citing DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLI-
GENCE: WHY IT CAN MATTER MORE THAN IQ 61–62 (1995)).
134. See infra notes 136–162 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 163–192 and accompanying text.  It should be noted that during composi-
tion of this Comment, the Illinois House of Representatives introduced a bill, H.B. 1452, 98th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013), that, if passed, would be a “major overhaul” of the
IMDMA. See Andrew Maloney, House Looks to Make Divorce Law Changes, CHI. L. BULL.,
Mar. 27, 2014, at 22.  If enacted, the bill (among other changes) would repeal section 701 and
relocate it to section 501, the section that permits parties to move for various forms of temporary
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A. Critique of the Application of the Current Section 701
Jeopardy Standard
A petitioner can satisfy the section 701 jeopardy standard with a
“showing of past harm which would lead to future physical or mental
jeopardy.”136  Past occurrences of physical abuse clearly satisfy this
standard and are more readily apparent than the more subtle, nega-
tive repercussions resulting from a child’s exposure to his high-conflict
divorce parents’ constant bickering in the home.137  As the first district
held in Hofstetter, the first section 701 case, physical abuse is undoubt-
edly sufficient to constitute jeopardy.138  But the particularly alarming
facts of Hofstetter may have inadvertently set the “high bar”139 cur-
rently in effect.
1. Critique of the First District’s Approach to Section 701
Since Hofstetter, the first district has repeatedly denied section 701
petitions when there is no evidence of physical abuse, effectively ig-
noring the subtler, negative effects on a child’s future emotional and
mental well-being from exposure to the high-conflict divorce.140  The
first district has required a finding of the “nature, frequency, severity,
pattern and consequences of past abuse and the likelihood of future
abuse” before holding the evidence sufficient to establish that contin-
ued co-occupancy of the home by both parties would jeopardize either
one spouse’s or the children’s physical or mental well-being.141  By
relief during proceedings and prior to entry of final judgment.  H.B. 1452 sec. 5-20, § 701.  Pro-
posed section 501(c-2), entitled “Allocation of the Marital Residence,” requires the same proce-
dure of filing a petition for exclusive possession of the home and retains the jeopardy standard.
Id. sec. 5-15, § 501(c-2).  However, section 501(c-2) concludes: “In entering orders under this
subsection (c-2), the court shall balance the hardships to the parties.” Id. sec. 5-15, §501 (c-2).
Thus, the new section 701 would finally align with the section 214 balance of the hardships test
advocated for in this Comment.  The bill passed the House on April 10, 2014 and is currently
pending in the Senate. Bill Status of HB1452, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ilga.gov/legisla-
tion/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=1452&GAID=12&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=72208&SessionID=85
&GA=98 (last visited June 15, 2014).
136. Nemeth, supra note 12, at 44.
137. For example, the risk of future physical jeopardy was readily apparent in Hofstetter, be-
cause the incident that provoked the wife to file and ultimately succeed on her section 701 peti-
tion involved her husband yelling at her, violently striking and threatening to kill her, and even
shooting a gun at her twice. See In re Marriage of Hofstetter, 430 N.E.2d 79, 81–82 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981).
138. Id. at 82.
139. In re Marriage of Levinson, 975 N.E.2d 270, 281 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
140. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lombaer, 558 N.E.2d 388, 390–92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (revers-
ing grant of exclusive possession in absence of physical abuse, despite evidence of wife’s mental
illness, her refusal to take prescribed medication, her irresponsible behavior around the children,
and the husband’s multiple calls to police that resulted in forced hospitalizations).
141. Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
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focusing on visible abuse in the home, the first district ignores the sub-
tler, negative effects that the parties’ arguing and hostility may be hav-
ing on their children.142
For purposes of jeopardy, the first district  incorrectly finds insuffi-
cient the stress and anxiety the parties experience by sharing the home
during divorce and the indirect effects this can have on their children.
For example, in Levinson the guardian ad litem openly admitted that
the parties’ sharing of the home was not in the children’s best inter-
est,143 and the trial court found the children experienced stress both
directly from the arrangement and indirectly through their mother’s
“high personal stress.”144  If a guardian ad litem, an attorney who is
appointed by a court to give recommendations regarding the chil-
dren’s best interests,145 testifies that the parties’ sharing of the home is
not in the children’s best interests, this should be sufficient to order
one of the parties to vacate.  This is especially true when continued
exposure to the tense, hostile parents can cause the children further
stress and anxiety with long-lasting, negative impact on future mental
and emotional development.146  Otherwise, what is the point of a
guardian ad litem advising the court that a particular condition is not
in the children’s best interests, if no responsive action is taken to rem-
edy that condition?
The first district in Levinson even admitted “possession of the mari-
tal residence [was] being used as a tool in the arsenals of [the parties],
two individuals involved in a contentious divorce.”147 If a court recog-
nizes that the parties are battling over possession of the marital home
purely to win one battle in a contentious divorce war, the court should
resolve this issue instead of prolonging an antagonistic dispute until
the final judgment.  By not stepping in at this junction, the court
foregoes an opportunity to temporarily resolve one of many un-
resolved issues and in so doing gives the parties another source of
ammunition with which to fight each other.
142. See id. at 390.
143. In re Levinson, 975 N.E.2d at 282.
144. Id.
145. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/506(a)(2) (2012) (“The guardian ad litem shall testify or sub-
mit a written report to the court regarding his or her recommendations in accordance with the
best interest of the child.”).
146. See supra notes 31–79 and accompanying text.
147. Id. at 284 (emphasis added).  One example of the contentiousness of this case is the
wife’s previous filing (and withdrawal, without prejudice) of a petition for an emergency order of
protection.  She alleged that the husband, while holding their son, grabbed her wrist, “pulled it
back and forth and twisted it several times,” then slammed it in a door. Id. at 272 & n.1.  She
alleged injury to her wrist and scratches on the son’s stomach. Id. at 272 n.1.
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Further, by justifying denial of a section 701 petition with concerns
of disrupting the stability in the children’s routine and environment,148
the first district is only shielding them from the reality of divorce.
While denying a section 701 petition may initially and briefly deter a
child’s sadness and emotional upheaval caused by one of her parents
moving out, it only delays the inevitable reality: her parents are get-
ting divorced and they will no longer reside together as a family
unit.149  Any immediate benefits to the children’s stability that may be
achieved by not ordering one spouse to vacate the home earlier in the
case are outweighed by the risk that the parents will further expose
their children to stress and pain in a “never-ending battle” until final
judgment.150  Ironically, the first district is effectively maintaining sta-
bility of a home environment characterized by the parents’ arguing,
hostility, and tension.  By rationalizing denial of a section 701 petition
on the basis that it will maintain the home environment for the chil-
dren, the first district in actuality only maintains the status quo of an
unhealthy environment for the children.
If the first district refuses to grant one spouse exclusive possession
of the home under section 701 due to an absence of past physical
abuse or for the alleged purpose of maintaining the current home en-
vironment for the children, the high-conflict divorce parents may both
continue to stubbornly refuse to leave the home, or one may be finan-
cially unable to do so.  The high-conflict divorce parties’ continued
cohabitation guarantees their children’s increased exposure to their
poor relationship model and arguing.  This in turn will only further
jeopardize the children’s mental and emotional development, thereby
contributing to lifelong, unhealthy behaviors and attitudes.151
2. The Second District’s Evolving Application of Section 701
None of the cases summarized in this Comment have expressly ac-
knowledged that, absent physical abuse, high-conflict (though non-vi-
olent) divorce parents who expose their children to their poor
relationship model can jeopardize their children’s future well-being.
However, some second district holdings imply what Heinrich explicitly
states: physical violence is not required to support a finding of “jeop-
148. See In re Levinson, 975 N.E.2d at 277.
149. See LIPPMAN & LEWIS, supra note 2, at 44.
150. See GARBER, supra note 3, at 77.  It also increases the risk of physical abuse if the tension
and hostility escalates beyond the parties’ control. See Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at
384 n.127 (citing GOLEMAN, supra note 133, at 61–62).
151. See supra notes 31–79 and accompanying text.
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ardy” under section 701.152  The holdings in Heinrich and Akers sug-
gest that the second district may be relaxing the stringent jeopardy
standard under section 701.
However, it is unclear if these holdings turned on the negative ef-
fects that high-conflict—though non-violent—divorce parents have on
their children.  For example, even though the Akers parents’ hostile,
tense interactions made their two children “cringe and fold up . . . and
withdraw,” the court noted that this evidence alone was “not abun-
dantly specific” regarding a determination of jeopardy under section
701.153  If the court had not held that the wife’s well-being was jeop-
ardized by the husband’s harassing behavior towards her personally,
the evidence regarding the children alone may not have been suffi-
cient to grant the wife’s section 701 petition.  The children’s reactions
to their parents’ arguing clearly show they were negatively affected by
the heated interactions.  These children were forced to view a poor
relationship model at a critical developmental stage when they needed
a “‘road map’ for healthy, respectful, and reciprocal relationships.”154
Similarly, the second district in Heinrich referenced in its finding of
jeopardy the one particular incident of the parents’ fighting in front of
their children, resulting in the police being summoned to the home.155
But the Heinrich court never specifically mentioned that the parents’
arguing may have negatively affected their children mentally or emo-
tionally.  Had the children not been in the same room during that ar-
gument or had the police not been involved, it is uncertain if the
parents’ general arguing would have carried as much weight.156  More-
over, the husband’s disregard of a prior court order requiring him to
undergo an alcohol evaluation157 influenced the court, which may un-
dermine its affirmation of the trial court’s finding of jeopardy.  The
second district may have been more perturbed by the husband’s disre-
gard of a court order than the negative effects of a contentious domes-
tic environment.
Also adding to the ambiguity of the courts’ evaluations of jeopardy
is the weight the second district accords to a secondary, alternative
residence in its decision to order one spouse to vacate the primary
152. In re Marriage of Heinrich, 2011 IL App (2d) 110683-U, ¶ 26; see also In re Marriage of
Akers, 2012 IL App (2d) 120526-U.
153. In re Akers, 2012 IL App (2d) 120526-U, ¶¶ 10, 26.
154. Firpi & Wenger, supra note 32, at 34.
155. In re Heinrich, 2011 IL App (2d) 110683-U, ¶ 7.
156. But even if a child does not see or hear his parents argue, he can still sense and be
negatively affected by the conflict and tension in their deteriorating relationship. GARBER,
supra note 3, at 48.
157. In re Heinrich, 2011 IL App (2d) 110683, ¶ 25.
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marital residence.  If the husbands in Heinrich and Akers did not al-
ready have alternative housing available, would the second district
still have ordered them to vacate the marital home?158  In the first
district, the availability of alternative housing to the nonpetitioning
spouse seems to be irrelevant in determining a section 701 petition.
For example, the nonpetitioning Levinson husband owned several
properties and had family in the area, providing him with multiple
options for residency outside the marital home.159 Similarly, in
Lombaer the husband offered to provide his nonpetitioning wife alter-
native housing if the court granted him exclusive possession of the
marital home, but the first district nonetheless denied his section 701
petition.160
Cases like Heinrich and Akers provide optimism for spouses in a
high-conflict divorce who are considering filing a section 701 petition
for exclusive possession of the marital home.  However, the recently
decided Levinson case is a harsh reminder that stress and any result-
ing negative effects on the exposed children’s development will likely
not suffice under section 701, at least in the first district.  The Akers
court specifically distinguished Levinson by noting that there, the
wife’s and children’s mere experience of stress, confusion, and insta-
bility resulting from the parents’ cohabitation did not constitute jeop-
ardy under section 701.161  But again, while feelings of stress, anxiety,
or confusion may not constitute immediately visible jeopardy to one’s
physical or mental well-being, the ramifications of a child’s exposure
to conflict will ultimately surface.162
B. The Benefit of Applying a “Balance of the Hardships”
Analysis to Section 701
Section 214 of the Domestic Violence Act provides a substantially
lower standard for exclusive possession of the residence compared to
the “arduous” process under section 701 of the IMDMA.163  First, ex-
clusive possession can be granted at an ex parte hearing, even if the
158. See id. ¶ 6; In re Akers, 2012 IL App (2d) 120526-U, ¶ 8.  Compare In re Marriage of
Lima, 638 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), where the husband had already moved out of
the marital home by the time the second district heard the wife’s section 701 petition, which may
have contributed to its denial.
159. In re Marriage of Levinson, 975 N.E.2d 270, 276 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).  Meanwhile, the
wife was living out of padlocked storage boxes and had no alternative residence while he occu-
pied the marital home.  Id. at 279.
160. See In re Marriage of Lombaer, 558 N.E.2d 388, 392 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
161. In re Akers, 2012 IL App (2d) 120526-U, ¶ 32.
162. See supra notes 31–79 and accompanying text.
163. See Nemeth, supra note 12, at 44.
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petitioner “could obtain temporary shelter elsewhere while prior no-
tice is given to [the] respondent.”164  It may be imprudent to permit a
party in an ongoing divorce proceeding to be granted this type of ex
parte relief under section 701.  The parties in a divorce case interact
with one another throughout the entire proceeding, which typically
lasts at least one year, but often even longer for a high-conflict di-
vorce.165  Thus, any opportunity to decrease the level of tension and
hostility between the parties should be encouraged, especially if minor
children are involved.166
However, the component of section 214 that would most improve
section 701 is its “balance of the hardships” test, used to determine
whether to grant a petitioner exclusive possession of the home.167
Under that test, courts must balance the hardships to the respondent
and any minor child in his care with the hardships to the petitioner
and any minor child in her care that will result from continued expo-
sure to either the risk of abuse or from losing possession of the resi-
dence.168  The section 214 balance of the hardships test is preferable
because it is more flexible than the rigid section 701 jeopardy test.
First, section 214 grants a presumption to the petitioner for exclu-
sive possession.  The respondent may rebut this presumption if he can
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the hardships to him
substantially outweigh those to the petitioner and any minor child in
her care.169  In determining whether the respondent’s hardships result-
ing from loss of possession of the home truly outweigh those to the
petitioner, the court would undoubtedly consider any alternative
housing options or his financial resources to obtain such housing.170
Conversely, if the petitioning spouse has alternative housing available
to her or the financial means to obtain it, a court may determine that
the nonpetitioning spouse’s hardships substantially outweigh those of
164. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/217(a)(3)(ii) (2012).  However, lack of notice is not permitted
under section 214 if “the hardships to respondent from exclusion from the home substantially
outweigh those to petitioner.” Id.
165. GARBER, supra note 3, at 131; see also Shienvold, supra note 6, at 33.
166. Nemeth agrees that “[t]he ramifications of an order of protection [under the DVA] at the
onset of a divorce case are large: the parties and oftentimes the attorneys are alienated, and it
tends to set a negative tone for future negotiations.”  Nemeth, supra note 12, at 45.
167. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(2)(B); see also In re Marriage of Akers, 2012 IL App
(2d) 120526-U, ¶ 21 (noting that balancing the hardships to the parties, “unlike section 701 of the
[IMDMA], is permissible under section 214(b)(2) [of the DVA]” (emphasis added)).
168. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(2)(B).
169. Id.
170. The nonpetitioning husband in several of the section 701 cases above did in fact have
alternative housing available in which he could have resided pending conclusion of divorce
proceedings.
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the petitioner.  The balance of the hardships test also emphasizes the
hardships of the petitioner if she is the caretaker of the parties’ chil-
dren.171  This consideration would have been helpful to the petitioning
wife in Levinson because the guardian ad litem specifically noted that
the children were primarily attached to and dependent upon their
mother.172
Second, section 214 permits a court to order the nonpetitioning
spouse to “provide suitable, accessible, alternate housing” for the peti-
tioner instead of granting the petitioner exclusive possession of the
home.173  Such a court order would have been helpful to the petition-
ing mother in Levinson, where the guardian ad litem felt the birdnest-
ing arrangement in the marital home was beneficial to maintain
stability for the children during the divorce.174  However, the wife had
no alternative residence in which to reside when she vacated the mari-
tal home for the husband’s parenting time; conversely, he owned mul-
tiple properties and had family living nearby to stay with when the
wife had the home for her parenting time.175  If the court could have
ordered the husband to make one of his properties available to the
wife during the divorce proceedings or provide her financial resources
to obtain alternative housing, this could have reduced the tension and
hostility between the parties that resulted from having to share the
marital home.
Third, section 214 encompasses harassing behavior that causes im-
mediate emotional distress.  Such harassing behavior includes “inten-
tional acts which cause someone to be worried, anxious, or
uncomfortable.”176  Conversely, section 701 requires “a showing of
past harm [such as physical abuse] which would lead to future physical
or mental jeopardy.”177  If the section 701 standard were more closely
aligned with section 214, it would conceivably cover the petitioning
husband in Lombaer.  He was clearly anxious and uncomfortable be-
cause his mentally ill wife engaged in erratic and irresponsible behav-
ior, did not adequately supervise their children, and refused to take
prescribed medications.178  Similarly, the petitioning wife in Levinson
felt stressed and anxious about sharing the marital home with her hus-
171. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(2)(B).
172. In re Marriage of Levinson, 975 N.E.2d 270, 274 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
173. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(2)(B).
174. In re Levinson, 975 N.E.2d at 277–78.
175. Id. at 273.
176. People v. Cardamone, 883 N.E.2d 628, 634 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (quoting People v. Taylor,
812 N.E.2d 759, 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)).
177. Nemeth, supra note 12, at 44.
178. In re Marriage of Lombaer, 558 N.E.2d 388, 390–92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
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band during their divorce proceedings for multiple reasons: she had
no privacy in an alternative residence; the husband left the house in
disarray after his parenting time; the “tension and hostility between
the parties” prohibited them from even being in the same place simul-
taneously; and the children were exhibiting behaviors such as aggres-
siveness, bedwetting, and reluctance to see their father, suggesting
they were also anxious and uncomfortable with the birdnesting
arrangement.179
Applying the section 214 balance of the hardships test to a section
701 petition would better address scenarios like the Lombaer and
Levinson cases: while physical abuse was lacking, the high-conflict di-
vorce parents could not continue to amicably cohabit the marital
home, and one (or both) refused to leave.  When a spouse is stressed,
anxious, or uncomfortable due to the other spouse’s co-occupancy of
the marital home during their divorce, the arguing and conflict in the
home will increase.  This in turn increases the child’s exposure to her
high-conflict divorce parents’ arguments, perpetuating the negative
long-term effects on her emotional and mental development.180
Fourth, and lastly, domestic violence victims under section 214 and
divorcing parties under section 701 should not be placed on unequal
footing when it comes to granting exclusive possession of the home.
While there is no denying that domestic violence is a serious issue, the
negative effects on children exposed to their divorcing parents’ argu-
ments in the home should be considered just as dangerous and seri-
ous.181  Section 214 encompasses harassing behavior that causes
immediate emotional distress, which includes deliberate acts that
cause one to become worried, anxious or uncomfortable.182  This
stress and anxiety can have psychological effects on children that are
equally devastating as domestic violence and that may last for a life-
time.183  But this stress and anxiety does not satisfy the jeopardy stan-
dard of section 701.
179. In re Levinson, 975 N.E.2d at 273, 278–79.
180. See supra notes 31–79 and accompanying text.
181. Studies show that when parents express a significant amount of anger in front of or to-
ward their children, the children become less empathetic, more aggressive, and more depressed
than their peers who live in more stable families.  Taylor, supra note 44.  Additionally, these
children tend to underperform in school. Id.  Overall, exposure to parental anger and conflict in
the home undermines a child’s “ability to adapt to the world,” and communicates that she is
unsafe and that there is something wrong with her. Id.
182. People v. Cardamone, 883 N.E.2d 628, 634 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (quoting People v. Taylor,
812 N.E.2d 759, 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)).
183. See infra notes 31–79 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, unlike an isolated incident of domestic violence that
prompts an emergency filing under section 214, a child’s experience of
his divorcing parents’ conflict in a section 701 petition begins long
before the divorce papers are filed and the parents establish separate
residences.184  And the earlier and longer a child is exposed to this
parental conflict, the greater the likelihood she will suffer “serious
emotional harm.”185
Further, providing a more lenient standard under section 214 may
also result in overcrowding the Domestic Violence Court docket with
section 214 petitions by divorcing parties who more appropriately be-
long under section 701.186  When a divorcing party assumes she cannot
prevail under section 701 and resorts to the more accessible section
214, this may result in “harm or disadvantage to true victims of do-
mestic violence.”187  First, if there was no preexisting domestic vio-
lence in the home, the petitioner may “create violence or fabricate the
threat” thereof in order to obtain an order of protection granting her
exclusive possession under section 214.188  Second, one commentator
warns that “the vast quantity of petitions and orders” under the DVA
may “dilute the effect of meritorious petitions and orders by legiti-
mate abuse victims.”189
In conclusion, children of divorced parents are already four times
more likely than children of intact families to get divorced as adults.190
Combine this discouraging statistic with the negative effects of a high-
184. GARBER, supra note 3, at 66.  While a child’s first experience of his parents’ conflict may
have been the first time she heard “loud voices . . . slammed doors and angry words,” her experi-
ence of her parents’ conflict likely began even before their first argument. Id.  The parental
conflict “dates back to those early, tense silences, no matter how much you may have pretended
that everything was okay.” Id.; see also Shienvold, supra note 6, at 33 (claiming that children of
high-conflict parents “show signs of emotional and behavior disturbances even before their par-
ents separate”).
185. GARBER, supra note 3, at 66.
186. See Nemeth, supra note 12, at 45 (stating that the effect of the current section 701 jeop-
ardy standard is to “promote filing for exclusive possession under the [DVA]”).
187. Id. at 44.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 45.  Nemeth herself recommends adding a paragraph to the Temporary Relief sec-
tion of the IMDMA that would provide “an unequivocal and unambiguous option to seek and
obtain exclusive possession of the marital residence and reduce tension and conflict that so often
erupts in front of minor children” at the outset of divorce proceedings. Id.  Texas has such a
statutory provision that takes into account the parties’ and children’s relative “financial, emo-
tional, and physical hardships” to determine who should have exclusive possession of the home
at the outset of the case. Id.
190. See Divorce Statistics and Divorce Rate in the USA, DIVORCE STAT., http://www.divorce
statistics.info/divorce-statistics-and-divorce-rate-in-the-usa.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). This
is because the child’s exposure to his parents’ divorce causes him “ambivalence about commit-
ment in a ‘disposable society.’”  Rufus, supra note 1.
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conflict divorce, and the long-term effects on a child’s ability to main-
tain lasting relationships suffers even further.  A child’s exposure to
her parents’ discordant relationship in the home alters the “founda-
tion upon which [s]he begins to build a sense of intimacy and reciproc-
ity.”191  The conflict shapes her perception of appropriate relationship
behaviors, such as communication, respect, compromise, negotiation,
self-expression of feelings, and how to support others.192  The longer
high-conflict divorce parents expose their children to their negative
interactions, the more ingrained the parents’ flawed demonstrations of
social skills become.  These effects should be considered equally dan-
gerous to domestic violence and merit application of the section 214
“balance of the hardships” test to section 701 petitions.
C. Proposed Reform to Section 701
If the current section 701 jeopardy standard is not interpreted to
encompass a child’s impaired mental and emotional development that
results from exposure to her high-conflict parents living in the home,
the statutory language should be replaced with a “balance of the hard-
ships” test.  In applying the balance of the hardships test to a section
701 petition, courts would engage in the following analysis:
First, the court would make an initial finding that the parties are
engaged in a high-conflict divorce by considering testimony from the
parties and by examining the overall nature of their case progression
since the filing of the divorce.  The following factors would be indica-
tive of a high-conflict divorce case: little progress has been made in
the case due to the parties’ refusal to settle even the most trivial of
issues; one or both parties stubbornly refuse to vacate the marital
home; and the frequency and intensity of the parties’ arguments in the
home.  The court would also consider evidence of the parties’ arguing
and hostility in the home preceding the filing of the divorce petition to
determine the length and extent of their arguing and hostility in the
home before the case commenced.
Second, if the parties have minor children and there has not yet
been a temporary custody order entered establishing the parenting ar-
rangement for divorce proceedings, the court would next hold such a
hearing to determine who will be the primary residential parent of the
children.  If necessary, the court would appoint a guardian ad litem to
make recommendations for the temporary custody order, because it is
191. GARBER, supra note 3, at 18.  This foundation will affect the child’s “first friendships in
grade school to first crushes in junior high and onward [and] shape [her] intimate adult partner-
ships.” Id.
192. See id. at 19.
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unlikely that the high-conflict divorce parties will be able to agree on
the temporary parenting arrangement.
Finally, the court would apply the balance of the hardships test to
determine whether the hardships to the nonpetitioning spouse and
any minor child in his care substantially outweigh those to the peti-
tioner and any minor child in her care that would result from contin-
ued exposure to either the risk of harm or from loss of possession of
the residence.193  The court would presume this balance favors the pe-
titioner.194  For example, if  the nonpetitioning spouse was previously
designated as the primary residential parent, this would be sufficient
to shift the balance of hardships in his favor and order the petitioner
to vacate the marital home, because it is preferable for the children to
maintain stability by remaining in the home during the divorce.
Using this balance of the hardships analysis to determine a section
701 petition is preferable in a sensitive legal proceeding like divorce
because it accounts for the relative hardships and financial resources
of each party.  Further, it considers who will be the primary caretaker
of the children and all other surrounding circumstances before decid-
ing who should have exclusive possession of the marital home.  More-
over, the required showing under section 214 is less stringent than the
jeopardy standard under section 701.195  This would help account for
the subtler, yet serious, negative effects that high-conflict divorce has
on the long-term emotional and mental development of children.196
IV. IMPACT
Like all other sections of the IMDMA, section 701 is to be “liberally
construed and applied to promote [the IMDMA’s] underlying pur-
poses.”197  Replacing the “high bar”198 of the current jeopardy stan-
dard with either a more liberal construction of the current statute or
with the balance of the hardships reformation will promote multiple
overarching policy goals of the IMDMA.
In addition to the IMDMA’s purpose of protecting children in-
volved in a divorce, the IMDMA also seeks to promote the “amicable
settlement of disputes.”199  The current section 701 standard makes it
difficult for a court to order one of two high-conflict divorce parties to
193. Cf. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(2)(B) (2012).
194. Cf. id.
195. Compare id., with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/701.
196. See supra notes 31–79 and accompanying text.
197. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/102 (emphasis added).
198. In re Marriage of Levinson, 975 N.E.2d 270, 281 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
199. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/102(3).
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vacate the marital home, even if it is evident they can no longer co-
habit peacefully and one of them (the petitioner) clearly does not wish
to continue cohabiting with the other.  The continued co-occupancy of
the marital home by such parties will only perpetuate their arguments,
foster their “never-ending battle,”200 and increase the risk of physical
abuse.201  Increased arguing, tension, and hostility will affect future
legal proceedings in which the parties are expected to amicably settle
their disputes, as they will likely be unable to agree on any issue.  This
will only augment their differences and conflict in an already “adver-
sarial court system”202 and will not further the policy of “amicable
settlement of disputes.”203
Relaxing the current section 701 standard will promote the
IMDMA’s goal of securing the “maximum involvement and coopera-
tion of both parents regarding the physical, mental, moral and emo-
tional well-being of the children during and after the litigation.”204
Parents in a high-conflict divorce are unlikely to cooperate with each
other for their children’s well-being, and cooperation will presumably
be even more unattainable if they are forced to live together in the
marital home during the case.  High-conflict divorce parties are “em-
broiled in emotion-laden conflict” and allow their own feelings to take
priority over those of their children.205  Given the divorcing parties’
“highly charged emotional state,” changing the focus from their mu-
tual feelings of hostility to the needs of their innocent children can be
quite difficult.206  Their children feel helpless and fearful when caught
in the middle of their arguing parents in the home.207  After litigation,
the parents may still be unable to cooperate regarding their children’s
well-being if they were forced to spend the entire divorce proceeding
living with each other, which likely only fostered their hostility toward
one another.
The underlying purpose of section 701 is to enable a court to “inter-
vene when necessary” in order to “protect spouses and children when
their well being is jeopardized,” and courts are purportedly given
“broad authority” to do so.208  Regardless of this “broad authority,”
200. See GARBER, supra note 3, at 77.
201. See Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 384 n.127 (citing GOLEMAN, supra note 133,
at 61–62).
202. GARBER, supra note 3, at 132.
203. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/102(3).
204. Id. § 102(7).
205. LIPPMAN & LEWIS, supra note 2, at 79.
206. Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 373.
207. See id.
208. In re Marriage of Heinrich, 2011 IL App (2d) 110683-U, ¶ 16.
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Illinois domestic relations courts have yet to recognize the negative
long-term effects on a child’s mental and emotional development and
future relationships that result when she is exposed to her high-con-
flict divorce parents in the home.  The risk of these future negative
effects on the children may not convince a court that intervention is
necessary because they are not as immediate or palpable as physical
abuse.  However subtle these effects may be, they impose a lifelong
burden on the children of high-conflict divorce when those negative
effects manifest themselves in their adult relationships.209
Finally, relaxing the section 701 standard could have the subsidiary
effect of clearing up the domestic violence court docket of petitions
inappropriately filed by divorcing parties that may untruthfully allege
physical abuse to take advantage of the more lenient section 214
standard.
V. CONCLUSION
Although courts typically prefer to play a passive role in dispute
resolution210 and are generally “reluctant to tell parents how to raise
their children,”211 ordering two high-conflict parents to establish sepa-
rate residences for the remainder of divorce proceedings properly ad-
dresses the inevitable reality of the family’s future.212  Granting a
section 701 petition gives the children and all parties involved healthy
closure and relieves hostility in the home and the children’s exposure
to their parents’ conflicts.213
A child does not ask for her parents to engage in a high-conflict
divorce, nor does she have the ability to remove herself from the mari-
tal home if her arguing parents continue to live together during pro-
ceedings.  A child of high-conflict divorce should not be subjected to
her divorcing parents’ unhealthy relationship model, especially when
that experience unconsciously and negatively affects her for the rest of
her life, thereby perpetuating a cycle of future unhealthy relationships
and divorce.  Section 701 should be applied in a more expansive man-
ner to encompass these negative effects and aid in ending that divorce
cycle.  If it cannot be applied more expansively, section 701 should be
reformed to include the balance of the hardships test applied under
section 214 of the DVA.  Such a reformation would allow a court to
209. See supra notes 31–79 and accompanying text.
210. Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 394.
211. GARBER, supra note 3, at 26.
212. Cf. LIPPMAN & LEWIS, supra note 2, at 44.
213. Id. at 38–39.  “Some children actually experience a sense of relief that the long stressful
ordeal is over.”  Shienvold, supra note 6, at 32.
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consider all the circumstances of the case, such as available alternative
housing, and it will not be limited by the strict jeopardy standard.  In
turn, this would better address the subtle, negative effects of high-
conflict divorce on the children.
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